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This volume of Research in Ethical Issues in Organizations (REIO) is an outcome of the 
Australian Association of Professional and Applied Ethics’ (AAPAE) 24th Annual 
Conference ‘Applied Ethics and in Fractured State’. The conference was held 21-23 June 
2017 at the University of Technology Sydney and hosted by the Institute for Public Policy 
and Governance (IPPG). It was convened by Bligh Grant who was generously assisted 
throughout by fellow members of the Organising Committee, Charmayne Highfield and 
Joseph Drew and the entire AAPAE Executive Committee, namely Hugh Breakey, Alan 
Tapper, Ian Gibson, Jo Namio, Kay Plumber, Michael Schwartz and Sunil Savur, with Sunil 
providing valuable experience drawn from his role as convener of the 2016 conference, held 
at the University of Adelaide, and his co-editorship of Volume 17 of REIO (Savur and 
Sandhu 2017). 
 
In searching for a conference theme, the organising committee was faced – as indeed most 
are – with the challenge of providing a topic that (a) was broad enough to be inclusive of the 
eclectic range of research and practice interests of the members and associates of AAPAE 
while (b) not being completely nebulous. Ultimately ‘Applied Ethics in the Fractured State’ 
was agreed upon. Yet the decision was not merely expedient. 
 
For instance, many traditions of political and ethical writing have defended the concept of the 
state as the legitimate site of ultimate authority – an authority which is justified not merely 
instrumentally but also normatively. In the (broadly) liberal tradition at least, we might be led 
to think of Hobbes’ Leviathan (1914[1651]) on particular on this point, and in a clichéd way. 
However, there are more contemporary and (arguably) very influential examples (see, for 
instance, Moore 1995). Moreover, it is an institutional fact that the laws enacted in (say) the 
parliaments of Australia and its constituent sovereign states only come into force when they 
are consented to by the Crown. And the situation is more or less similar in other types of 
political systems – in republics, for example – save the absence of a monarch. So the idea of 
there being an ultimate, legitimate authority is very much – and literally – an enacted one in 
our day-to-day lives. 
 
However, a vast quantum of writing (particularly in the broadly liberal tradition) has sought 




moral reasons (and recognizing that the split between ‘instrumental’ on the one hand and 
‘moral/ethical’ on the other hand is in any event a misnomer). And while we might be led, at 
least initially, to think of the concept of the separation of powers in a very modern sense – for 
instance, a la The Federalist Papers (see, for instance, Kammen 1986) and the philosophical 
underpinnings of this in inter alia Locke’s (1988[1698] justification of private property, we 
can remind ourselves that writers as diverse as Machiavelli (1979[1517]) and Hegel 
(1952[1820]) advanced profound justifications of the division of authority in political 
systems, while at precisely the same time advocating for the unity of those systems. 
Moreover, the few (the very few) of us that exercise an interest in sub-national government 
would point out that the idea of subsidiarity has, inter alia profound deontological 
foundations (see, for instance, Drew and Grant 2017). 
 
And of course there are many more examples of writing that has been centrally concerned 
with the proper division of authority in polities. More recently, these arguments have 
increasingly been joined by those asserting that non-state organisations (private corporations) 
quasi-state bodies (statutory organisations) and professional associations all have the capacity 
to self-regulate, through mechanisms such as Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), codes 
of professional practice and indeed the sheer virtue of the individuals comprising these 
organisations. In terms of applied ethics, we are on more familiar ground here, and one does 
not have to travel – or indeed reach – too far to witness the contemporary pervasiveness of 
these arguments, presented as they are, in very convenient sets in business ethics textbooks, 
and within which the sovereign – even when supported by institutional arrangements of 
(varying) democratic thickness – is reduced to a mere ‘stakeholder’ of the private corporation 
(see, for instance, Crane and Matten 2016).  
 
Yet paradoxically the failure of minimal regulation – witnessed in the Global Financial 
Crisis, for example (see Flynn 2012) alongside the apparent effectiveness of a strong state in 
developmental contexts (see, for instance, Grant, Liu and Ye 2018) have both served as 
evidence that the state ought to be defended as a distinct source of authority, morality and 
ethical practice. 
 
All too frequently these arguments are debated in structural (or political) and empirical (or at 
least what might be described as ‘normatively shy’) ways. Yet conceived as a series of ethical 




authority, in liberal and other societies, form an unspoken backdrop to much of the work of 
organisations and the people that comprise them. As well, we ought to be aware that 
historically the concept of ‘the state’, according to an authority no less than Quentin Skinner, 
originally referred to the condition of the ruler, not government. For Skinner (1978, p. 3) 
‘The decisive shift’ entailed in modern political thought was: 
 
[F]rom the idea of the ruler maintaining his state – where this simply meant upholding his 
position – to the idea that that there is a separate legal and constitutional order, that of the 
State, which the ruler has a duty to maintain. 
 
This alerts us to the idea that ‘the state’ is also an intrinsically existential concept, which 
throws open questions of the self and identity alongside those of regulation and governance 
discussed above. In short, we thought that there was plenty of grist for the conference mill in 
‘Applied Ethics in the Fractured State’ – at the level of ethics and institutions, and (in 
particular) in examining the relationship between the two. Indeed, there was some inquiry into 
these themes during the course of the conference, as there has been in the recent academic 
literature (see, for example, Haugaard 2017; Hindess 2017; Jessop 2011; Rockman 2016).  
 
Yet this hardly constituted the whole conference program. On the contrary – and as one would 
expect – there were panels covering CSR (reflected in the presentation by our first academic 
Keynote Speaker, Professor Carl Rhodes (2017)) and panels covering regulation (reflected in 
the presentation by our second academic Keynote Speaker, Professor Janine O’Flynn (2017)) 
alongside panels discussing (more or less) traditional Western ethical theorising. However, 
also strongly represented were explorations in (broadly) Eastern ethical writing – 
Confucianism and Buddhist ethics – and (in particular) medical and pharmaceutical ethics, in 
particular the issue of euthanasia. These later themes were exemplified in the presentation of 
our third Keynote Speaker, Alida Lancee MD (2017). 
 
OUTLINE OF SPECIAL EDITION 
 
In short, the result of the ‘Fractured State’ theme was a diverse conference – which is entirely 
appropriate for AAPAE. This is reflected in the refereed proceedings, which can be divided 
into four broad areas of research. First, what we have denoted (above) as ethical theorising 




problems surrounding role obligations can be fruitfully informed by a consideration of 
Confucian ethics, properly understood. Provis notes that within the business ethics literature 
three types of ethical problems are associated with roles. The first of these is ‘role relativism’, 
i.e., where a prescribed role may either excuse conduct that is otherwise questionable or re-
prioritize ethical concerns – what might be termed the problem of blind obedience to authority 
or indeed behaviour driven only by the requirements of organisational imperatives. The 
second is ‘role definition’, where what is actually required by a role is ambiguous (what does 
it mean to be a ‘parent’, a ‘teacher’, for example) and ethical conflicts that can arise from this 
ambiguity (in, for example, competing obligations to fellow employees, subordinates or 
employers). Third, ‘role identification’, where ethical problems arise due under-identification 
with a role (giving rise, for example, to low performance) or indeed over-identification – the 
zealous parking inspector. 
 
Provis notes (1) that the three types of problems are intertwined and (2) that both 
deontological and teleological attempts at addressing them have proven less than satisfactory. 
In inquiring into the possibilities for a virtue ethics account of role prescriptions and 
Confucian virtue ethics in particular he contests what might be described as the bifurcation of 
Confucian virtue ethics (as, in essence, role derived) and Western virtue ethics (as, in essence, 
trait-based or individuated), while nevertheless asserting that choice is a more salient feature 
of business than Confucianism and that slavish conformity is at odds with classical 
Confucianism also. Rather, Confucianism ought to be understood as commencing from an 
understanding of everyday life (including the familial) which is virtue-based (for instance rén, 
or ‘humanness’; zhī, or ‘wisdom’ and chéng, or ‘integrity/sincerity’) and where role 
performance is situated rather than ideal, requiring considered judgement (not relativism) 
rather than conformity. 
 
Revisiting the ethical problems associated with roles equipped with this understanding of 
Confucian virtue ethics, Provis argues that role relativism is militated against by seeing roles 
in their broader contexts and that problems of role ambiguity and role conflict can be seen 
with the advantage that virtue ethics offers, namely with an emphasis on integrity and 
authenticity when set against both deontological and teleological approaches. Moreover, 
problems of role identification (either ‘under-identification’ and ‘over-identification’) are seen 
not only through a deontological or consequentialist lens, but with (again) with proper 





In her contribution, Chand R. Sirimanne provides an account of the significance of intention 
(cetanā) in Buddhist ethics (specifically a Theravāda Buddhist stance) and asserts its 
increased relevance in our digital age, where (arguably) the ethical self is increasing distanced 
from our actions. Noting the ‘Four Noble Truths’ and the ‘Eightfold Path’ to Enlightenment, 
the author emphasizes the inseparability of psychology an ethics in Buddhism and that intent, 
or volition, is key to the ethos of same, and can be disaggregated into intention of 
renunciation; intention of good will and intention of harmlessness. 
 
Sirimanne performs the valuable service of explaining some common misunderstandings 
about core elements of Buddhism. Thus, karma does not signify the (unintended) 
consequences of actions (or ‘just deserts’); rather it denotes wholesome and unwholesome 
volitions. Meditation (bhāvanā) ought to be understood not as introspection but as a 
‘cultivation of the mind’, and anattā not as a lack of agency but as a questioning of the 
concept of an extant and fully-formed soul – rather, this has to be developed. Sirimanne also 
outlines the reasons for the popularity of Buddhism in the West, namely the lack of a deity; 
the onus on the individual to achieve salvation; the absence of moral absolutes; its questioning 
approach to ethical issues and its advocacy of compassion. While there are similarities with 
elements of utilitarianism and virtue ethics (in particular its Eudaimonist branch), the author 
notes that the central doctrine of anatta (non-self) rules out any direct parallel, as (arguably) 
does Buddha’s acceptance of women in monastic orders. 
 
This appreciation of intent (cetanā) allows for different (but by no means wholly unfamiliar) 
ethical perspectives on issues such as abortion, suicide, discrimination and the parameters of 
sexual behaviour. Noting that the application of these ideas to governance and morality is 
complex (‘only a fool becomes a king’ – see Zimmerman (2015)) Sirimanne nevertheless 
argues that a Buddhist ethos, grounded in an understanding of intent (cetanā) militates against 
the increasing anonymity of the digital age. 
 
The second broad area covered in this edition of REIO is medical ethics. In his contribution, 
Xavier Symons investigates conscientious objection in health care, asking how we might 
distinguish between legitimate conscience claims and those based upon prejudice. The 




conscientious objection (which rests on the profundity of belief) and the ‘incompatibility 
account’, where any objection is assessed against the obligations of health care professionals. 
 
Symons provides an account of Rawls’ concepts of ‘reasonableness’ and ‘reasonable 
disagreement’, grounded as they are on a procedural account of justice and being richer than 
an account based upon mere rationality, to necessarily involve normative principles – 
particularly that any inequality must not include inequality of opportunity and that any 
systematic inequalities must be of the greatest benefit to the least advantaged in the long-run. 
Moreover, any disagreement must be compatible with public reason rather than absolutist. For 
Symons (following Rhodes 2012) the transposition of this framework of ‘reasonableness’ and 
‘reasonable disagreement’ from the political to the medical is justified on the grounds that 
basic medical care is an essential service; that medical care involves consensual interventions 
that would otherwise be classified as violations of bodily integrity; that health care is an issue 
of equality of opportunity and that medical practice is circumscribed by law. As such, the 
normative framework for decisions about conscientious objection ought to be the same as 
those that frame (Rawlsian) political discourse. 
 
Importantly for Symons, all of this is underlain by the (Rawlsian) defense of ‘liberty of 
conscience’ and surrounded by the issue of what constitutes ‘the private domain’, and he 
examines Robert Card’s (2014) account of ‘intrinsic’ and ‘extrinsic’ factors for conscientious 
objection in relation to these. On Card’s (2014) account, while many conscientious objections 
are ruled out for normative (Rawlsian-type) reasons, others will need be determined by 
empirical evidence, assessed by a ‘Medical Conscientious Objection Review (MCOR) board. 
The problems that Symons has with this approach are (1) that it does not recognise that every 
kind of conscientious objection involves an imposition of views and (2) that there are cases 
where there are justifiable, but differing views about conscientious objection – such as 
euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide (E-PAS). 
 
As a means to address this impasse, Symons argues that any decisions based around evidence 
ought to incorporate normative (in essence, Rawlsian) elements in the discussion. Symons 
also argues that an eclectic account of what constitutes ‘basic medical care’ (i.e., one that is 
inclusive of different approaches to medicine) needs to be developed as part of the operations 




would be difficult, it would be both possible and fruitful to reach a ‘reasonable’ view of what 
this constitutes. 
 
In any discussion of contemporary issues in applied ethics, the subjects of euthanasia and 
assisted suicide loom large. In their contribution to this ‘Special Edition’, Judith Kennedy MD 
and Michael Kennedy MD examine the consequences of the increased support for euthanasia 
and assisted suicide in Australia. The authors are careful to specify the parameters of their 
discussion, stating that rather than assessing the arguments for and against the two practices 
they are interested in examining the ‘moral vulnerabilities of medical practice when both 
euthanasia and assisted suicide are added to the therapeutic armamentarium’.  
 
Commencing with a definition of medicine, the authors examine how long-standing law 
across Australia’s jurisdictions has addressed the question of inter alia the terminally ill, 
arguing that this has been consistent with the goals of medicine. Yet this is rapidly changing. 
Noting the recent legislative developments in the Australian states of Victoria and New South 
Wales (NSW), Kennedy and Kennedy provide timely evidence as to how a range of 
professional associations – the Australian Medical Association (AMA), the Advent Mutual 
Group (the largest professional indemnity organization in Australia), the College of Nursing, 
the Australian Psychological Association (APA) and the Law Institute of Victoria (LIV) have 
all positioned themselves in relation to the issue. The authors make several observations about 
these changes, including that the incorporation of killing into Australian medical practice has 
already begun – signified not only by the position statements provided by the aforementioned 
organisations, also by an identifiable change in nomenclature; also that legalized killing in 
health care will necessarily involve a range of professions and require actively managing the 
attitude and behaviour of these professionals. They also explore how these changes are 
leading to moves to protect both patients and professionals, particularly doctors. 
 
The authors’ position is overwhelmingly one of profound concern. They detail several 
challenges to medical practice arising from these developments and examine these from a 
squarely moral perspective, emphasising that while doctors do not act alone, the responsibility 
will rest principally with them. They conclude by noting that authorization to kill could very 
well result in a ‘slippery slope’ (our phrase) situation and note developments in other 





In their contribution to this ‘Special Edition’ of REIO Joseph Drew and Bligh Grant examine 
the same issues of concern in the previous chapter, but through the lens of the ‘Principle of 
Double Effect’ (PDE) and utilizing an in-depth case study. Initially the authors’ underscore 
the basis of PDE in Natural Philosophy, which holds that there are binding and universal 
truths that are discernable by reason and hold for all people, one of which – the most 
important for their discussion – is human life, and around which the propositions of ‘dignity’ 
‘the common good’ and ‘solidarity’ coalesce. The authors also note that while Natural Law is 
often associated with Christianity and Catholic Social Teaching (CST) in particular in fact it 
is also associated with Aristotle and the three major monotheistic faiths (Judaism, Islam and 
Christianity) and that the precepts of Natural Law are enshrined and enacted in many judicial 
systems.  
 
Following from a definition of PDE, the authors emphasize that ‘foreseeability’, 
‘proportionality’ and – as we saw in Chand Sirimanne’s contribution in her discussion of 
Buddhist ethics – ‘intent’ are all of paramount importance in determining whether an act is 
morally licit or otherwise. Moreover, the issue of intent is of particular importance in 
evaluating the process of dying, ‘because if death is intended, rather than merely foreseen, 
then the whole moral and legal evaluation changes dramatically’. Examining prevailing 
definitions of euthanasia from both the scholarly and regulatory literature, the authors draw a 
more finely-calibrated distinction between voluntary, non-voluntary and involuntary 
euthanasia, before providing a detailed (but redacted) account of what they term ‘a case study 
of dying’ and applying PDE to this particular example. They conclude – after referencing the 
Queensland Criminal Code – that the first of three critical acts in the case study was neither 
morally or legally licit. In particular, Drew and Grant draw our attention to situations where 
conscious but aphasic patients could be aware of decisions being made on their behalf, yet not 
be in a position to have their opinion heard, and/or experience the anguish of family members 
making decisions. 
 
The authors argue that the example illustrates the ‘non-voluntary’ or ‘involuntary’ nature of 
some euthanasia events and that there are a number of public policy implications of this. First, 
that the issue of non-voluntary euthanasia has not been at the forefront of recent debates; 
second, that religious authorities ought to be especially cognizant of non-voluntary 
euthanasia, as they administer many aged-care and palliative facilities. Third, that there is a 




provide clear instruction around procedures and care for end of life patients and that 
arrangements for enduring powers of attorney (EPA) should be mandatory for all admittances 
to aged-care and palliative facilities. Fourth, that arrangements for implementing an expedient 
institutional form of dispute resolution for such patients ought to be investigated. Finally, that 
statutorily enforced guidelines around such issues need to be developed. 
 
The third broad area is regulation/policy and ethics, and perhaps it should come as no surprise 
that the two contributions are both in the area of health regulation. In her chapter, ‘When 
health workforce governance met regulatory capitalism: Australia’s national arrangements for 
health professional registration and accreditation’, Fiona Pacey positions the registration of 
health professionals in Australia in a regulatory capitalism framework. Through an 
exploration of the ‘National Registration and Accreditation Scheme’ and its operational 
elements, namely the Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency (AHPRA) and its 
fourteen national boards, Pacey outlines how the new arrangement is quasi-independent, 
which allows the state to consolidate its position in the health workforce market. 
 
Prior to the Scheme, there were more than 90 organisations with responsibilities for 
administering local health regulation legislation and within these there were inconsistencies, 
gaps and contradictions. By moving from a state and territory model to a national model of 
health professional regulation, Pacey argues that the there is greater consistency for 
practitioners and workforce planners, and she carefully traces the development of the national 
scheme. Following from a Productivity Commission recommendation in 2005 to move to a 
national scheme, an Intergovernmental Agreement was signed in 2008 which outlined the 
broad objectives of the regulations to be developed. These objectives are reflective of 
traditional regulation and also incorporate aspects of workforce reform. The putative benefits 
of the scheme have included a single registration agency for practitioners, a central location 
for information and complaints for patients and a national approach to policy concerns and 
workforce planning for government.  
 
Pacey also reviews the literature on Independent Regulatory Agencies (IRA) in asking the 
question of whether the agency is independent and if so, from what or whom. She concludes 
that the Scheme is best described as a quasi-independent national regulatory agency, with 
government retaining some critical authority, as a means of managing socio-political risks, 




ensuing quest for independence is then assumed to be one designed to ensure balance, where 
the state can maintain influence and the professions are constructively engaged but do not 
have the autonomy to set their own standards and monitoring arrangements. 
 
The discussion of the National Registration and Accreditation Scheme in the context of 
regulatory capitalism, independent regulatory agencies and quasi-independent bodies 
provides an insight into the changing institutionalization of regulatory and reform functions 
of the state. Her discussion of regulatory capitalism, which she defines as the merger of 
neoliberalism with an attentiveness to risk, situates the scheme in a larger context of 
increasing delegation to business, individuals and the society, while at the same time (and 
perhaps paradoxically) increasing regulation by the state. 
 
In their contribution, “The impact of the National Mutual Acceptance on research governance 
practices in Victorian public healthcare agencies”, Bernice Davies, Anona Armstrong and 
Maree Fitzpatrick explore the arrangement introduced in 2013 which allows healthcare 
agencies to conduct a single ethical review for multi-site clinical trials. The discussion 
presents the results of a survey and series of semi-structured interviews designed to explore 
the future of the National Mutual Acceptance (NMA) and whether it is leading to 
standardised research governance practices.  
 
The NMA, introduced in 2013 as a successor to various state-based models allows for a 
single ethics approval to be accepted by multiple jurisdictions as a means to make health 
research easier and economically competitive. Focusing on Victorian public healthcare 
agencies, under the NMA the process involves a single proposal to a certified human research 
ethics committee. Organisations from participating jurisdictions then access the single review 
in lieu of submitting their own ethics application. Each organization then undertakes an 
individual site specific governance review to determine their risk appetite and capacity to 
participate. Reviews are due to be completed within 60 days, although practice suggests there 
is some confusion as to when participating sites are endorsed and that the practices of 
individual organisations are diverse and inconsistent. 
 
In their review of the relatively new literature on research governance, the authors identify 
concerns about overly bureaucratic and duplicative approval processes which result in delays 




need for organisations to appear legitimate to their stakeholders – is applied to explore 
research governance and the NMA. The research seeks to discover if there is evidence of 
support for the NMA (is coercive), if there is evidence of collaboration and learning between 
agencies (is mimetic) or, if there is evidence of agencies participating in professional 
standards (is normative). 
 
Given the robust research methodology, the study makes a number of findings, the most 
significant of which points to a lack of evidence that organisations were developing standard 
research governance responses to the NMA, thus disproving the argument of institutional 
theorists that organisations tend to develop similar behaviour in response to the same 
environmental constraints. The authors conclude that there are mixed views on how the NMA 
is impacting research governance; moreover that there is some confusion about its purpose. 
However, they identify that the NMA has the capacity to deliver quality clinical trial 
outcomes, maximise resources and create performance metrics if there are consistent 
governance practices and that failure to harness these opportunities could see Australia lose 
its competitive edge in health research. 
 
The fourth broad area is one which, arguably, sits at the core of the research and applied 
activities of AAPAE and of this journal, namely professional ethics. In the final paper, Helen 
E Christensen explores the professionalisation of those who facilitate participatory 
democracy within and on behalf of government institutions. In the paper, “Community 
engagement and professionalisation: Emerging tensions”, she argues that these (arguably, 
emerging) professionals, who design, communicate and facilitate community engagement 
processes, serve multiple masters: their clients (or employers), the public good and 
democratic process.  
 
Community engagement, also known as public participation, is the involvement of 
communities in decision-making processes around policies, plans and programs. Christensen 
argues that it has become a standard feature of public-state relations. Surrounding these 
engagement processes are those who practise it, a group which is gaining increasing scholarly 
attention. Christen explores whether or not the practice of community engagement can be 
considered a profession, and whether or not those who practise can be considered 




communities on one hand and the public institutions that employ or engage them on the other 
hand, and that this dichotomy creates a series of tensions. 
 
Christensen reviews the literature on professionalism and then focuses in on Noordegraaf’s 
(2009) conceptualization of ‘pure’ professionalism. She then uses this framework to assess 
the professional status of community engagement. Through the presentation of a series of 
short vignettes, the author demonstrates the types of tensions practitioners may experience. 
These include how inclusive practitioners are when they involve community members and 
the amount of control they are granted over the decision-making processes therein; whether 
neutrality of the practitioner should be prioritised above other virtues, and whether the needs 
of the practitioner, the client or the democratic process should assume priority. Christensen 
notes that there is currently little to no guidance for practitioners faced with these dilemmas. 
 
In her broader observations, Christensen returns to three foundational issues. The first is 
whether community engagement is really a profession. Reflecting on Noordegraaf’s (2009) 
framework, she concludes that a profile of the field is emerging and that while there is some 
‘semblance of a profession’ it is not conclusively demonstrated. The second is what tensions 
community engagement practitioners face and how they manage these. The third is how 
ethics can inform an understanding of the professionalisation of community engagement. 
Christensen concludes that there is the opportunity for reflection and examination of 
decision-making models, practitioners’ traits and virtues to allow them to develop ethical 
responses to the complexities they face in their practice. She also concludes that community 
engagement practitioners are uniquely placed between communities and institutions and that 
there is an opportunity for the field to support practitioners in making good decisions in the 
face of the inevitable dilemmas that arise from this unique position. Moreover, the failure to 
harness this opportunity may adversely impact practitioners, public institutions and 
democracy itself. 
 
The guest editors would like to thank the series editors, Associate Professor Michael Schwartz 
and Associate Professor Howard Harris for the opportunity to edit this ‘Special Edition’ of 
REIO. We would also like to thank all the authors who submitted papers for consideration and 
all of our colleagues who performed the invaluable service of peer-reviewing the blind 
manuscripts for the ‘Special Edition. Circling back to the conference, we would like to thank 




Carl Rhodes (UTS Business School) Professor Janine O’Flynn (then of University of 
Melbourne; now of the Australia-New Zealand School of Governance [ANZoG]) and the 
Institute for Public Policy and Governance at the University of Technology Sydney, 
particularly Ms Eeva Routio for all of her assistance with marketing, photography, the 
conference website and logistical support.  
 
We were especially pleased that the 2017 Conference attracted a strong participation rate from 
Higher Degree Research (HDR) students – almost 40 per cent of the presentations overall – a 
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